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FAILURE OF BRIBES AND STANDARDS
FOR POLLUTION ABATEMENT
TALBOT PAGE*
After Coase wrote The Problem of Social Cost, there followed a
series of papers which stressed the reciprocal nature of the externality
problem. These papers have argued that bribes and charges play
symmetrical roles, each Pareto-optimal, that the difference between
the two systems boils down to an arbitray assignment of property
rights, and that there is no reason to prefer a charge system to a bribe
one.' And in recent papers there has appeared another form of
symmetry, this one between standards and fees. In linear programming models of polluting firms, fees and standards become duals. In
these models, optimal regulation can be achieved either by setting a
standard, whereby the effluent fee falls out as a shadow price or by
setting a fee which achieves the optimal standard.2 To achieve
optimality it makes no difference whether standards or fees are
imposed.
Much of the discussion of both symmetries-between bribes and
charges and between standards and fees-has been in the context of
two-party models in which each party is defined a priori as a polluter,
a pollution receiver, or both. In this paper I ask (1) what happens in
the somewhat more natural setting where there are two industries,
one polluting and the other not, and where there is free entry or exit
by individual firms? And (2) what happens, especially with respect to
equity considerations, as we move from a pre-regulation situation to
one with environmental controls? The most interesting conclusion is
that opportunities for industry entry or exit make standards systems
inefficient. Industry mobility also renders commonly proposed bribe
systems inefficient as well. And bribe systems designed to avoid
inefficiency either reduce themselves to fee systems or introduce
*Research Associate at Resources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C. The author wishes to
acknowledge Fred Wells and Kerry Smith, both of RfF, and Mark Sharefkin, of Cornell
University, for their helpful comments.
1. See Tullock, Asymmetry Between Bribes and Charges: A Comment, 2 Water Resources
Research 854 (1966); Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 53 Economica 383 (1962); Dolbear,
On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 90 (1967); Demsetz, The Exchange
and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. Law & Econ. 11 (1964); A. Kneese & B. Bower,
Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (1968); Mishan, Reflections on
Recent Developments in the Concept of External Effects, 11 Can. J. Pol. Econ. (1965); Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). The early Coasian portion of neutrality was
soon modified to take into account wealth effects and transactions costs.
2. See, e.g., Russell, Models for Investigation of IndustrialResponse to Residuals Management
Actions, Swed. J. Econ. 138 (1971).
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permanent inequities as we move from a pre- to a post-regulation
equilibrium. The fee system comes off best, achieving efficiency and
preserving equity as we move from pre- to post-regulation.
To simplify the exposition, I assume that pollution is pervasive
-that is, one cannot move away from it. This assumption, while it is
beginning to have a ring of truth to it, is much stronger than necessary
for the argument below, which can be generalized to allow for
non-pervasive pollution and for opportunities of defensive actions on
the part of pollution receivers.
The idea is to place the pollution problem into the context of a
competitive model. Then the fee, bribe, and standards systems can be
easily compared. This is done informally below and the model is
closed, slightly simplified and technical details added in the appendix.
THE COMPETITIVE REFERENCE
We are accustomed to think that products flow out of a firm and
factors into it. Yet even though pollution flows out of a firm, it is more
suggestive to think of pollution emission as a factor of production
rather than a joint product. In terms of valuation, smoke is analogous
to any other factor of production. From the firm's point of view,
smoke and labor have derived value because both contribute to the
firm's product. From the point of view of laborers and smoke
receivers, labor and smoke have negative value. In terms of technical
trade-offs, we are interested in how capital and labor substitute for
smoke, just as we are interested in how capital substitutes for labor.
While it is a "mere formalism" to set up the problem with pollution a
factor rather than a product, it is suggestive as well as mathematically
convenient to avoid joint product production functions.
The production function of the ith firm in the polluting industry is
assumed to be in the form
K = capital
L = labor
S = smoke emissions.
The total emission of smoke is simply the sum of the emissions from
each firm. By the assumption of pervasiveness, the pattern of
emissions is not important, only the aggregate amount.
There are three basic ways to achieve abatement. A firm can tack
on pollution control equipment and with additional capital and labor
achieve smaller smoke emissions. A firm can adopt process change so
that capital and labor in the main plant substitute for smoke
emissions. Or a firm can abate by producing less. All three forms are
subsumed in the function above. I assume that for a given level of
X = gi(K,L,S)
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abatement a firm chooses efficient mixes of tack-on equipment and
process change.
For the non-polluting industry (Z), a typical production function is
Z = fi(K,L)

Just as a firm's demand function for labor is its marginal revenue
product of labor, so is a polluting firm's demand function for smoke
emission the marginal revenue product of smoke. If there is no
regulation, so that the price of smoke is zero from the point of view of
the firm, the firm will emit smoke until the marginal revenue product
of smoke is driven to zero. The polluting industry demand for smoke
emissions is defined by the sum of individual firm demands. So far the
model is a conventional competitive one.
The definition of the "supply function for pollution reception" is a
bit unusual, however, for this is where the "public goodness" of the
problem enters. To define a labor supply function, we add horizontally individual marginal rates of substitution between labor hours and
dollars; to define the supply function for pollution reception, we add
vertically the marginal rates of substitution between pollution level
and dollars. The supply function tells us how much damage is done, in
the aggregate, to society by a unit increase in pollution. Pervasiveness
and upward-sloping individual damage functions insure that the
supply curve, once defined, looks like a conventional competitive
3
supply curve.
We suppose that the rest of the model is competitive-there are
competitive markets for Z and X, K and L. Given an effluent tax r,
which equilibrates the demand for smoke emission with the supply of
smoke reception, the model behaves like a conventional competitive
one. We can appeal to the fundamental theorem of welfare economics
to assert that the competitive equilibrium of this model will be
Pareto-optimal. As mentioned, the only departure from a competitive
model is in the definition of the supply curve for smoke receptions.
3. To derive a labor supply function, we call out a price (wage rate) and add the quantities
of labor offered by each laborer at that price. A point on the labor supply curve tells us, in a
social sense, the cost of adding one more unit of labor at a given level of existing labor supply.
To derive a supply function for pollution reception, we call out a quantity of pollution emission
and count up the marginal damage caused at that level for pollution. The supply function of
pollution reception tells us how much damage is done, in the aggregate, to society by a unit
increase in pollution. While defined differently, both supply functions, the private one for labor
and the public "good" one for pollution reception, convey the same information. Each tells us
the (social) cost of a unit increase in quantity, be it labor supplied or pollution emitted.
For a relation of this definition of a public bad supply with Samuelson's treatment of the
demand for a public goal, see Page, Economics of Involuntary Transfers: A Unified Approach to
Pollution and Congestion Externalities, 85 Lecture Notes in Econ. & Mathematical Systems
(1973).
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While unusual, this supply curve has the property necessary for
Pareto-optimality: it measures the social cost of the last unit of smoke
emission demanded.
REGULATION BY FEES
Now that we have a competitive reference, we can compare the
market equilibrium before regulation with the equilibrium after. To
facilitate the comparison, we start in a world of equals where
everyone is endowed with an equal claim on the services of capital
and labor. Without regulation, T is set, by default, to zero. In the
market equilibrium there will be too much X relative to Z and too
much smoke. In Arrow's terms there is an inconsistency between the
supply price (high) and demand price (zero). The polluting industry's
advantage of having free smoke emission is competed away. With free
entry and the implied factor mobility, the profit rate and rates of
return to factor services are equalized between industries. The
pre-regulated state is a world of equals.
With the imposition of the effluent fee r which equates supply and
demand for smoke, the economy achieves the competitive standard
and at the same time preserves the world of equals. As Pareto-efficient
ratios of products X to Z and factors K, L, and S are achieved, factors
and probably firms move between industries. In this model polluters
are not "bad guys reaping tainted profits" but just black-box like firms
responding to the wrong price signals in the pre-regulation situation.
With "competition" there are many small firms compared to the
whole industry, and any one firm's emissions has very small impact on
marginal social damage done by all firms' emissions. The optimal fee
r measures, with negligible error, the marginal social cost of each unit
of smoke emitted by a single firm. In this case, the total effluent fee
paid by the ith firm emitting Si amount of smoke, TSi, approximates
the incremental social damage done by the single firm's emissions. In
the "non-competitive case" where a single firm i has more than
negligible effect on the marginal social damage, TSi represents the
social damage of firms i plus a factor surplus from smoke reception.
The above is illustrated in Figure 1.
In practice we know very little about aggregate social damage
functions and our knowlege of abatement costs is growing rather
slowly, in part because many firms see it to their advantage to
exaggerate abatement costs. Under this veil of ignorance, many
people are reluctant to advocate effluent taxes because they have no
idea of the effects of a particular tax level. On the other hand, they
have an idea of the environmental quality they would like to see. In

October 1973]

FAILURE OF BRIBES AND STANDARDS

Figure 1
$

0

Competitive case

$

y[_ - - --

Z

Si

Smoke

0

"Non-competitive case"

Si

Smoke

For both panels:
r is the effluent tax, constant per unit, optimally set.
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In panel 1A (IB), rr (wr) is the social marginal damage curve from firm i's emissions.
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of pollution emitted (B) plus factor surplus
(E) from smoke reception.

this situation a variant of the effluent tax become attractive: auction a
specified number of pollution permits. Each permit allows a specified
emission per unit time. Instead of the tax level being known and the
resulting environmental quality uncertain, the auction system
transfers uncertainty from the environmental quality to the post-regulation level of the tax. If it happens that the auction price of a unit
pollution ticket equals the marginal social damage, then this system is
equivalent to an optimal effluent tax. If the auction price is clearly
higher than estimates of the marginal social damage, then next year a
larger number of permits can be sold.
An interesting question is how long should the permit length be?
With perfect capital markets and perfect foresight the date of
expiration doesn't matter. But with imperfect capital markets and
uncertainty the permit length becomes a policy instrument. If we are
uncertain how damaging pollutants are going to be judged next
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year-perhaps this year it seems that sulphur dioxide is the most
damaging pollutant, then next year particulates-we may want to
encourage flexibility in abatement technology. In this case we may
want permits to expire each year. Alternatively, if we are fairly
certain how damaging each pollutant is and if we are fairly certain
our evaluations won't keep changing, it is less important for
abatement technology to be flexible. In this case we could encourage
long-term "lumpy" processes by auctioning 20-year tickets. Just as
there is an optimal length for a labor contract, there is an optimal
length for a pollution permit. It is even possible to consider permits
with infinite expiration dates; the government could buy permits off
the market to increase environmental quality. But with free industry
entry, similar to the situation with bribes and standards as we shall
see, giving rights away just to those who are already polluting would
create inequities.
Suppose that by the fee system or its auction variant the price of a
unit emission costs the polluter more than the marginal social
damage. Is it necessarily bad policy to have this tax "too high?"
Consider that firms already pay "too much" for capital because of the
corporate income tax and "too much" for labor because of the social
security tax. Given these taxes it seems intuitively clear that second
best optimality requires a wedge between the demand and supply
prices for pollution in order to move toward efficient ratios between
capital, labor, and pollution.
REGULATION BY BRIBES
In a typical bribe system the government pays polluters for each
unit of abatement. To get the right marginal signal, we must have

aB
asi

= -7

where B is the total bribe paid the ith firm. That is, marginal decline
of the bribe for a unit increase in pollution measures the marginal
pollution damage. Other things being equal, this condition implies by
simple integration that B = A - rSi for some constant A. The choice
of A defines a status quo point for which the bribe payment is zero. It
is usually recommended that the status quo point be the amount of
emission existing before regulation, say S. Then A = Sr and
B = r(S - Si), so that if a firm chooses to do no abatement, it gets a
zero bribe. If a firm chooses to pollute more than S, perhaps because
of changing demand conditions, the bribe would become negative and
a fee. To rule out negative bribes (fees), Tullock once suggested that
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the status quo point S be that level of emissions which "inflicts the
maximum damage." 4 For models with rising damage functions, and
marginal social damage functions above zero, Tullock's status quo
point would be infinite (there would not exist a point of maximum
damage).
In the above context, where B = A - rSi, an effluent fee system is
just a bribe system with the status quo point chosen to be zero.
Alternatively, we think of a bribe system as a fee system with the
lump sum bribe A tacked on. The lump sum bribe A can be
interpreted as an allocation of property rights. If A = 0, then we have
rights to clean air resting with the public and a fee system. If A =S r,
we have rights to pollute resting with the polluters and a bribe
system. The Coasian position is that the assignment of property rights
is arbitrary and does not affect economic efficiency.
Compared with a world of two industries with free entry, a world
of two parties with no industry mobility favors the view that
assignment of property rights has no effect on efficiency and is
arbitrary, especially when it is hard to define who is imposing on
whom. In Coase's example, the confectioner is making noise, but the
confectioner was there first, and the doctor initiates the problem by
moving too close. Who is the polluter?
There are several reasons why Coasian bargaining is rare in
practice. First, as the Coasians are quick to point out, property rights
are often not clearly defined with respect to pollution. But even with
explicit definition of property rights, social custom inhibits rather
than encourages direct Coasian bargaining. 5 And when the polluting
party or the receiving party has more than one member, a whole new
externality problem arises. This second externality problem, organiza6
tion within each party, is well described by Mancur Olson.
Putting aside these practical obstacles to Coasian bargaining, we
would find that for most pollution cases there are important asymmetries in threat opportunities. Consider the simple example of a bus
with just two passengers, a smoker and a non-smoker. While the rights
to smoke or clean air can be clearly defined, asymmetries in the
bounds for status quo points allow different threat opportunities. A
status quo point of zero is well defined and appropriate when rights
are assigned to the non-smoker, but there is no well-defined status quo
point of smoke emissions when the rights are assigned to the smoker.
If the right to clean air is assigned to the non-smoker, he benfits from a
4. 2 Tullock, supra note 1, at 854.
5. Until recently pollution rights rested with smokers on airplanes. In this period, did you
ever see a Coasian bargain struck between a smoker and a non-smoker?
6. M. Olson, Logic of Collective Action (1964).
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low-as-possible status quo point, but he cannot claim less than zero for
it. On the contrary, if the right to pollute is assigned to the smoker, he
could pretend that his habitual level of smoking was very high in
order to get a larger bribe.
The threat possibilities from assigning property rights to the
polluter have not gone unnoticed. U.S. Steel in the early sixties
established a status quo point from which to measure future abatement by a calcultion of what emissions would be if all its equipment
were in use, some of which had not been on line for years. By
establishing a very high book value of emissions, U.S. Steel was able to
increase its emissions year by year, while the book value of abatement
7
also increased year by year.
In a two-party world with fixed roles, one can at least define the
pollution rights, even if there are asymmetries in threat possibilities.
The situation is more ambigous when there are polluting and
non-polluting industries with free entry and exit. In this more fluid
situation there are several ways which bribe systems might be set up,
of which I will mention four.
1) It is sometimes suggested that the bribe system be available to all
those in the polluting industry. In this case the "lump sum bribe"
becomes a price signal encouraging entry into the polluting industry.
The situation is similar to the case of the cotton industry, where
people join the industry in order to get payments not to grow cotton.
Although the inefficiency of conditioning the "lump sum bribe" upon
industry entry is well known, 8 the scheme is nonetheless recommended. The federal government is currently trying to launch a not-growing opium industry in Turkey, for another example. Of course, the
problem is that with opportunities for industry entry, "lump sum
bribes" conditional on industry membership are not lump sum
transfers at all.
2) In order to make the lump sum bribes truly lump sum
(unconditional), we could take a snapshot of the economy at a point in
time before regulation and set status quo points equal to what
happened to be each firm's emissions at this time. If firm i were
emitting Si = Si before regulation, its bribe after regulation would be
r(S i - Si). The trouble with this approach is that it leads to new and
permanent inequities. Before regulation, free entry and competition
preserved the world of equals established by initial endowments. In
7. J. Esposito, L. Silverman, et. al., Vanishing Air 82-84 (1970).
8. See Bramhall & Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments, 2 Water
Resources Research 615 (1966); A Kneese & B. Bower, supra note 1, at 104; J. Boyd, The
Problems of External Diseconomics: With Special Emphasis on River Water Pollution, 1967
(Ph.D. Dissertaion at University of Minnesota).
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the pre-regulation situation with free entry, there is no reason to
argue that polluters should get special treatment, and in fact no firm
gets special treatment. But regulation by the snapshot bribe system
creates special and permanent benefits for those polluting at the time
of regulation. If polluter i closes down and joins the non-polluting
industry, he still carries his lump sum bribe rS i with him under the
snapshot bribe system. At the time of regulation, there is no basis,
except the chance distribution of firms between industries, upon
which to justify the new and permanent inequities. The "lump sum
bribes" are indeed lump sum in the snapshot bribe system, because
they are arbitrary. But being arbitrary, there are no easier to justify
than any other arbitrary and permanent distortion of income distribution.
It is not surprising that this type of bribe system is recommended by
those who happen to be polluters in the pre-regulation situation. For
example, sheep ranchers want to be compensated for not using
poisons. In the model above, with free entry and exit, there is no way
to justify such compensation. But in the actual world, where there are
entry and exit costs, there are gounds to allow temporary compensation to defray adjustment costs. Temporary adjustment compensation
is quite a different matter, though, from the permanent lump sum
transfers of the snapshot bribe system.
3) One way of avoiding the inequities involved in a snapshot bribe
system is to first condition the "lump sum bribes" on industry
membership and then to offer them to anyone who might enter the
polluting industry in order to obtain the bribe and to promise
continuance of the bribe for anyone who contemplates leaving the
polluting industry but who hesitates for fear of losing the bribe. This is
essentially the alternative developed in the Kneese-Maler paper in
this same issue. Kneese and Maler point out that this is an unlikely
alternative in practice. Furthermore, in a context of free entry this
bribe system becomes indistinguishable from a fee system. Everyone
gets the "lump sum bribe," which is financed by lump sum
presumably equitable taxes; in other words the "lump sum bribes"
play no role.
4) The most favored bribe system in practice cheapens capital
used for pollution abatement. For example, § 103(c)(4) of the IRS Code
allows interest on municipal bonds for pollution control machinery to
go tax free. This alternative is inefficient for several reasons:
A) Tax-free interest subsidies are generally inefficient ways of
transferring money out of the Treasury.

B) There is no connection between the marginal subsidy to the
marginal social damage of pollution.
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C) The bribe is conditioned on entry into the pollution control
industry.
D) By subsidizing only one factor of production for pollution
abatement, efficiency distortions are created between factors.
These alternatives demonstrate that there is no way to define a
bribe system, distinguishable from a fee system, so that it is efficient
and does not introduce new and permanent inequities. The alternatives also suggest that there are many ways to define a bribe system to
be inefficient, inequitable, or both, when there is free entry and large
numbers of polluters and receivers.
REGULATION BY STANDARDS
The possibility of mobility between industries undermines a
standards system as well as a bribe system. In terms of our
competitive reference, a standards system is a type of conditional fee
system. Pollution below a certain condition, a standard, the fee is
subsidized to zero; above the condition the fee is huge, a fine or jail
maybe, to make up, as it were, for the subsidized inframarginal
pollution. If the fine were set equal to the social cost of exceeding the
standard, we would have half a fee system where A now defines the
standards Si:
S,I < A
> A

fee= 0

fee = r(S i - Si).

Usually, however, the fine is not related to the additional social
damage T(S i - Si) or to the total damage TSi, and the fine is by no
means certain of application.
The basic failing of a standards system is that it gives the wrong
price signal to the inframarginal units of pollution-the pollution
below the standard. Figure 1 suggests the nature of the problem. In
the competitive case (Figure 1A), r measures the social marginal
damage of firm i's first unit of pollution and also each unit thereafter.
For given capital and labor and with effluent tax r, firm i sees his
private gain from the first unit of pollution as the segment Tx, which is
also the net social benefit. Under a standards system the private cost
of polluting is measured by the schedule OSiyz (Siy is a fine or jail
costs). The private cost of polluting up to Si is zero. In this case the
private benefit of the first unit of pollution is Ox. As the social benefit
is still only segment rx, there is now a gap between private and social
benefit. By private calculation, the benefit from entering the polluting
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industry and polluting up to the standards is C + D, whereas by a
social calculation the benefit is only C.
Inframarginal gaps between private and social benefit do not
necessarily prevent economic efficiency. In the "non-competitive
case" with optimal effluent fee r, the private benefit from the first
unit of pollution is segment xr, while the social benefit is segment xw.
The gap works in the right direction; as the private incentive is to
expand emissions from 0 to Si , the gap produces a social surplus E.
On the other hand, interpret wr as a supply curve for labor. An
attempt, on the part of firm i, to exploit the laborer's potential surplus
E by monopsony pricing will indeed affect economic efficiency.
Returning to the question of standards, suppose we have an
"optimal" standard, which equilibrates demand for pollution emission
with supply of pollution reception (the marginal damages). In
equilibrium each firm is gently snugged against his standard limit, no
firm is under litigation for excessive pollution. With free entry the
profit rate is equalized in both industries. From this "optimal"
situation imagine a polluter firm switched into the non-polluting
industry. By the firm's calcuation, the value of the loss of smoke
emissions is zero, since it paid zero for the first Si units of smoke, but
by the social calculations, the value of the loss of smoke emissions is
6 i While a standards system can give the right signal not to pollute
further for a firm in the polluting industry and pressing against the
standard, it gives the wrong signal for firms on the margin of entering
the polluting industry. In a market equilibrium, where standards lead
to the right balance between clean air and smoke emission, society
gains by switching some polluters into non-polluting industries
This same basic inefficiency happens in various standards systems,
sometimes along with additional inefficiencies, as we can see in the
two alternative systems below.
1) Absolute standard system. Each firm is given an amount of
emissions permissible per year. Suppose, in the example of the world
of equals, every polluter had the same production function. Suppose
the government first brings the economy to a Pareto optimum by a fee
system. The equilibrating fee is TO with So aggregate amount of
pollution and n firms in the polluting industry, and each polluter
emitting S°/n. The government decides to institute a standards system
by charging no fee but forbidding any firm to pollute more than S°/n.
9. Presumably, capital and labor would not remain fixed as firm i changes smoke emissions. I
leave this argument at the heuristic level here, not worrying about the relationship between
definitions of benefits and surpluses and the path of integration. In the appendix the argument is
developed in a way which avoids this definitional problem.
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Immediately the profit rate shoots up in the polluting industry, and
additional firms enter from the clean industry. The government
discovers that its standards are too weak and tightens them. Eventually we arrive at an equilibrium where the profit rates are equalized
between industries, and there is just the right amount of pollution,
judged on the basis of abatement costs and social damage from
pollution. However, there are too many too small firms in the
polluting industry and the price of X is too low relative to the price of
Z. By assuming a world of equals, I have avoided a second and
oft-remarked inefficiency associated with standards. In practice there
is not a world of equals and polluters have different production
functions and different amounts of pre-regulation emissions. And in
practice administrators sometimes allocate abatement by calling for
proportional cutbacks from each polluter. The added inefficiency of
proportional cutbacks is well-known. 10 Besides its basic inefficiency,
one of the most unattractive features of an absolute standards system
is the difficulty in allocating abatement to achieve a given ambient
standard.
2) Concentration standards. One of the ways of allocating abatement while avoiding proportional cutbacks is to express the standard,
not in absolute terms, but as a permissible concentration. One variant
is to require effluents to meet certain standards of dilution with
respect to the reviewing medium. For example, we might require the
S per unit air be less than some limit for smokestack emission.
Another variant is to require that the emission per unit product be
less than some ratio (S/X be less than same standard. The grams per
mile standard for car exhaust is of this form.). An effluent standard by
permissible emission concentration is very common, because it is an
administratively easy way of allocating abatement effort among
size-different firms and has a surface appearance of equal burden.
Concentration standards are favored by large firms, which fear that
absolute standards would either hurt them relatively compared with
smaller firms or would publicize their far greater absolute emissions.
But concentration standards have the same inefficiency failure as
absolute standards, because they give a price signal of zero social
damage for the units of pollution below the concentration limit. And
similarly, concentration standards which lead to the right ambient
pollution level encourage too much entry into the polluting industry.
In addition to sharing the same inefficiency as the absolute standard, concentration standards often introduce a second inefficiency. Sometimes effluent dilution is an important factor in pollution
damage, but usually the pollutants mix in the receiving medium
10. A. Kneese &B. Bower, supra note 1, at 104.
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quickly enough so that the aggregate concentration is overriding. The
damage is not related to parts per million coming out of a smokestack
but parts per million at the street level. For street-densities, the
absolute mass of pollutant emission is important, not how much air
was mixed in at the stack. Similarly for water pollution, while outflow
densities are sometimes important, total loading is usually more
important.
For the case where mixing happens soon after emission and the
important consideration is total loading of a medium, concentration
standards put an artificial price on the diluting factor. More water
may be pumped through a paper mill in order to get more allowable
pollution discharges. When the diluting medium is the product itself,
it is safe to say that the ratio of pollutant to product has little to do
with the social damage of the pollutant. Consequently the signal to
raise the denominator of S/X in order to get a little more of the
valuable (to the firms) numerator will be a socially incorrect one.
The only hope in saving the standards approach from allocative
inefficiency is to restrict mobility between industries. We can see the
problem by again returning to the competitive reference. Imagine, for
example, an economy functioning with optimal effluent taxes. The
government decides to switch to a standards system. First, it takes a
census of the emission from each polluter. Whatever the itl firm
happens to be emitting under the fee system becomes its permissible
standard, and the fees are dropped. In order to prevent entry to the
suddenly more profitable polluting industry, instead of tightening
standards across the board, this time the government sets up entry
barriers. Firms that were previously in the non-polluting industry are
given a zero level emissions standard. This version of a standards
system is considerably more rigid than the snapshot bribe system,
because the former freezes resource allocational patterns and firm
mobility, while the latter "only" redirects and freezes income
distribution patterns. As both systems create the same inequities, this
version of a standards system, which erects entry barriers by policy,
seems worse than the snapshot bribe system. If we had started from a
pre-regulation situation and then imposed standards, we would have
to exclude and create barriers to entry in order to achieve allocation
efficiency.
There is a unique case where both absolute and concentration
standards amount to the same thing and both are efficient. This is the
case when the optimal emission is zero; there are no inframarginal
units of emission and hence no subsidized units. An outright ban has in
this case the same effect as an optimal effluent fee.
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LESS THAN PERVASIVE POLLUTION
The assumption that pollution is pervasive was made for convenience and now can be relaxed. People can and do defend themselves
against pollution by moving away, washing windows more frequently,
and so on. To adjust for those actions, we simply define r as the
marginal social damage which occurs when the pollution receivers
have undertaken their best defensive strategies.
With large scale pollution problems it is unrealistic to assume that
the pollution recievers can be compensated, out of the effluent fees
collected, in proportion to the marginal damage received by each,
just as it is unrealistic to assume that public goods can be financed by
marginal benefit taxes. There are two implications from the
impossibility, as a practical matter, of marginal compensation.
The Mohring-Boyd asset utilization approach implies that swimmers should pay marginally based fees for the opportunities they
preclude to a chemical plants' dumping at the same time chemical
plants pay marginal fees for the opportunities they preclude to
swimmers. In a model similar to the above, swimmers need not be
paid for the chemical plants' damage, nor need they pay dollars in
order to swim. They would pay, however, in terms of their defensive
strategies, perhaps by swimming less, or by swimming more at less
convenient locations. One implication of the lack of marginal
payment to pollution receivers is that the Mohring-Boyd requirement
of pollution receivers to also pay marginal fees, to limit their
activities, is not necessary for Pareto-optimality."
It is conceivable that the swimmers might incur damages in order
to force the chemical plant to stop polluting. Coase mentioned the
possibility that farmers might plant crops close to a railroad track in
order to get compensation, and sometimes the fear is expressed that
people will move next to an airport in order to bring suit, win noise
abatement suits and raise housing values. This type of strategic
activity becomes impractical when there are large numbers of
pollution receivers, so that the damage suffered by an organizable few
is a small fraction of the total damage. It is usually not worth it for
relatively small numbers to incur large individual damages in order
that the total marginal damage increase by a small fraction. The
resulting abatement is likely to benefit mostly those who did not
bother to undertake strategic action.1 2
A second implication of the practical impossibility of making
marginal damage payments is that nearly everyone, from his own
point of view, will receive the wrong amount of pollution. The
11. Baumol, On Taxation and the Controlof Externalities, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1972).
12. M. Olson, supra, note 6.
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involuntary transfer of asbestos particles into my lungs is a trespass on
my freedom-no different in principle from the involuntary transfers
involved in crime which happen after equating aggregate marginal
costs and benefits of police protection. That is, one of the costs of
using pollution as a factor of production is the resulting loss of
freedom and individual choice on the part of the receivers of
pollution. To compensate for forced collective consumption, society
should get something more than a marginal revenue product equal to
a sum of marginal rates of substitution, computed as if there were free
choice on the part of pollution receivers.
CONCLUSION
I have maintained that for two industries with free entry a bribe
system not conditioned on present polluting activity is either indistinguishable from the fee system or is inequitable in a way which the fee
system is not. A standards system is generally inefficient: in a context
of free entry it cannot both give the right signal to a firm's effluent
emission and the right signal for industry entry.
If we weaken our assumption that externality suffering is independent of the receiver's activity, we get the same conclusion except the
effluent tax will be defined equal to marginal social damage after the
victims have adopted their best defensive strategy. And if we admit
externality interactions, such with the case of Coase's doctor and
confectioner, we may (or may not) want to define both parties as
"polluters."
If we allow for barriers to entry and exit, there will be windfall
losses to polluters, for imposition of the fee system. For barriers due to
sunk capital, these windfall losses will be temporary costs of
adjustment. If we are to choose among bribes, standards, and fees; if
we want to prevent the creation of permanent inequities and
inefficiencies; and if the costs of administration are neglected, the
policy prescription is clear: set the lump sum bribe to zero (that is,
use fees) and, at most, help subsidize the adjustment costs. Inframarginal subsidization and "lump sum bribes" create the wrong signals for
industry entry.
APPENDIX
Assume a two-good economy (Z and X) with a large number of
people, each of whom is a consumer as well as a producer. There are
two factors of production, labor (L) and smoke (S). The first good (Z) is
made only with labor and the second good (X) is made with labor and
smoke. Each person, in the role of a producer, is a firm with his own
production function. All the firms in the Z industry share the same
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production function and likewise for the firms in the X industry. Since
tradeoffs between capital and labor play no important role, we drop
K as a factor of production.
The following conditions establish an initial world of equals for
people as income receivers. (1) Each person is endowed with one unit
of labor. (2) Each person can freely choose which industry to join.
We assume that the number of people (N) is large enough both to
prevent individual bargaining and to guarantee the competitive
condition that any one firm's behavior has a "negligible" effect on
prices. Prices include not only the explicit commodity price and the
implicit labor wage but also the implicit smoke wage soon to be
defined as the unit effluent fee.
Finally, we assume that while each polluter is bothered by the sum
of other polluters effluent, he is indifferent to his incremental
contribution to that sum. Although there is some truth in the idea that
for a large number of polluters one's own contribution becomes
negligible, this assumtpion is made to separate producers profit
maximizing behavior from consumers' utility maximizing behavior.
Once the argument is completed, it will become clear that all the
above assumptions, including this last one, can be greatly weakened.
We define, using where appropriate, superscripts for demands and
subscripts for supplies:
N
i
I-Li
Si
Zi
Xi

=
=
=

=
=
=

population
amount of labor in X industry for Mr. i.
amount of labor in Z industry for Mr. i.
amount of smoke generated by i.
(1-Li)Z 0 i's production of Z
g(Li, Si) i's production of X
This function is neo-classical and has constant
return to scale. A firm's abatement possibilities
and subsumed in g by allowing L to substitute
for S.

N
k=l Lk = n, effective number of firms in the X industry
=
amount Z demanded by
i
=
amount X demanded by i
N
k= Sk = amount of smoke consumed involuntarily by every person
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N
U i(Zi , X1, Z Sk) = concave function for i, where U1 = U1 >0,
1
k~i 0
U1 > 0, U1 = U1 < 0, alli.
A. Pareto Conditions
In the absence of any institutions, market or otherwise, we find the
Pareto conditions by maximizing any person's utility subject to all
others' utilities held at predetermined levels, the production constraint, and boundary conditions on X, Z, S, and L. The necessary
conditions will give us the customary definitions for the optimal
effluent tax and the optimal bribe.
max

H =u(zi xi" f
k~i

+ N
jfi

N
khj

-- '

Zm, Xm, Sm, Lm: :
1< m <N

Zk _ NZO + ZZ

+ CC]

Ikk

Lk

X k _ Y g(Lk, Sk)

+2Y2

k

k

We compute the costs and benefits of a unit increase in smoke
generation for Mr. i:
N
= Z
UJ -o29=
g0
asi
i
-H

Moving the cost to the RHS (right hand side) and dividing both
sides by the numeraire marginal utility of Z, we have
N
I- 'U's
-2 9XS
jri
Ui
U1
Z
Z
To eliminate the Lagrangian multipliers we make use of:

aH
i

az'

aH =cc
Li

Z

UZ

z

1c0

Z

Z° -

L

=20

2 =

cc
I

_

gL
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Substituting and remembering that the marginal disutility of one's
own smoke is zero, we may write the necessary Pareto conditions:
N
k=1

-Uk
S

Uk

~Z

0

1

g-S

The LHS (left hand side) is the supply of smoke reception (or the
cost side). If smoke increased by a unit, it tells us the amount Z would
have to increase in order for society to be as well off as before the
Zo
smoke increase. The RHS is the demand side. The expression -is
gL the
ratio of the marginal products of labor, which in equilibrium is also
the price ratio between X and Z. A unit increase in S is technologically translatable into Zg units of Z.
gL
Condition (1) is a variant of Samuelson's condition for the optimal
provision of a public good.' 3 Samuelson balances the social value of a
public good against the costs of producing it. For us, smoke is a bad
and not wanted for its own sake. Thus we are not interested in
balancing the (dis) value of smoke with the production cost of
generating smoke, here assumed to be zero. However, smoke has a
derived value, as it is a factor of production. This derived value is
balanced against the social disutility of breathing smoke.
Zo
Writing - as the price ratio p, we can plot the two side of (1) as
functions of smoke for the firm i who specializes in the polluting
industry by putting his entire unit of labor into g(Li,Si):
Units
FIGURE A-1
z

13. See Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 387
(1954), see in particular condition (2).
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Each firm in the polluting industry X poses the same cost-benefit
problem for society. Due to the complete symmetry between firms as
polluters, at any Pareto point all polluting firms will generate the
same optimal amount of smoke. This optimal amount, in the diagram
S*, depends of course on which Pareto point is chosen. In general
there will be a different Pareto point for each selection of the UJ.
Without incentives to abate, each firm in industry X will generate S
at level So, where gs=O. The optimal abatement is So - S*. The
marginal social cost at the Pareto level of emissions is defined as the
optimal unit effluent tax r. The total fee that Mr. i pays for generating
Si smoke is Sir. We identify So as the status quo point for the bribe
system. Under the bribe system, Mr. i will be paid r for each unit of
smoke not generated, counted from SO. That is, the optimal bribe is
defined as (S° - Si)T.
The status quo point S° is determined by the production function
alone and is independent of the distribution of wealth or the pattern
of tastes. The status quo point is important since it defines the lump
sum transfer SOT, which, when added to the optimal fee -SiT,
transforms the fee system into the bribe system. Its importance does
not guarantee its existence, however, and for several common
production functions, notably the Cobb-Douglas, there is no welldefined status quo point.
How should we dispose of the effluent tax revenues or finance the
bribe payments? The simplest solution is to distribute or raise the
money (in units Z) equally. Under the assumptions at the beginning of
this appendix this amounts to a rule of proportional distribution for
the fee system and proportional taxation for the bribe system.
If all people suffered equally from smoke pollution (for example
with identical utility functions), this proportional payment rule would
follow the marginal benefit rule for financing public goods. However,
we have assumed that Mr. i's smoke causes Mr. i no discomfort. The
marginal benefit rule indicates each person should receive a share of
Mr. i's effluent tax payment in proportion to each one's marginal
suffering. This rule would give Mr. i no fraction of his own effluent
payment. Exclusion of Mr. i from a share of his fee payment balances
his assumed exclusion from suffering from his own contribution to
pollution, and both exclusions simplify the algebra. Consequently, we
shall divide up Mr. i's effluent tax payment equally among everyone
except Mr. i, who gets no return of his own effluent tax payment. Mr, i
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does get I of each of the other fee payments and his addition to
(N-i)
income from the fee system is
N
I

Sk

(N-I) ki
We shall adopt a corresponding definition of Mr. i's tax payment
needed to finance the bribe system.
B. A Digressionof Definitions of Effluent Fees and Bribes
Before going on to demonstrate the failure of the bribe system, we
shall discuss briefly definitions of fees and bribes found in the
literature. Besides the definition above the total fee payment for Mr. i
is sometimes defined as
where

fSi D(s)ds

-U

D(s) =

k

(s)

uk

and Mr. i's total bribe is
fS
sds
S
i's generation of smoke
i
So status quo point
In this case the lump sum bribe is the area under the social
marginal damage curve from 0 to So (equal to OABCSoin figure 1).
This "lump sum bribe" is just large enough to insure that the total
bribe received is never negative. For lump sums between 0 and
0fSD(s)ds we have a general bribe-fee which chould change sign
14
depending on effluent discharge.
The integral definition of the bribe is compatible with a Coasian
world where pollution rights rest with the polluter and where the
polluter can extract the whole consumer surplus from abatement and
where the numbers are small enough so that inframarginal damage
differs from marginal damage, for a single firm. Alternatively, if clean
air rights rest with the consumers, we might expect a definition of the
fee
fSi

0

pgs (1,y)dy

14. See Freeman, Bribes and Charges: Some Comments, 3 Water Resources Research 287
(1967); and Kamein & Dolbear, Asymmetry Between Bribes and Charges, 2 Water Resources
Research 149 (1966).
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which extracts the entire producer surplus from pollution. H-Ivever, I
have not seen this definition explicitly written down.
Sometimes the definition is given with such generality as not to
distinguish between a unit marginal rate and an integral tax.
Buchanan and Stubblebine define the correct Pigovian tax as one
whose "rate of tax at the margin is made equal to the negative
marginal evaluation of the [externality] activity." 15 Of course, both
the integral definitions and the marginal rule rate one are designed to
have just this "correct" property.
As Plott has pointed out, some eminent economists have made the
mistake of defining an effluent tax to be levied on the product (X)
rather than its polluting factor (S).16 Plott shows the non-optimality
of this tax by a counter-example using smoke as an inferior factor of
production. Plott is right in general for neo-classical production
functions where a pollutant is a factor of production. We can easily
see in our model that it is impossible to define a tax on X that leads to
a Pareto-optimal ratio of L to S. For Leontief production functions, of
course, a tax on X is indistinguishable from a tax on S,and in this case
a product tax can be efficient.
Quite commonly, the fees and bribes are defined, as we have done,
to be rSi andT(S ° - Si).17 This definition of the fee has the advantages
of simplicity and symmetry with the payment for other factors of
production. These two advantages explain our choice of definition.
However, the integral definitions would lead to the same failure of the
bribe system.
C. Markets with Fees
Under a fee system each person maximizes his utility subject to a
revenue constraint but without regard to the welfare of others.
N
max

ui(Zi, Xi,

S)

subject to either

Xi, Zi, Si}
15. Buchanan &Stubblebine, supra note 1, at 382.
16. See Plott, Externalities and Corrective Taxes, 33 Economica 84 (1966). Plott cites J.
Meade, 0. Davis, A. Whinston, J. Buchanan, C. Stubblebine, Mishan and even A. Pigou as some
economists that have made this mistake.
17. See Dolbear, supra note 1; Plott, supra note 16; Davis & Whinston, Some Notes on
Equating Private and Social Cost, S. Econ. J. 116 (1965); Davis & Whinston, On Externalities,
Information, and the Government Assisted Invisible Hand, 33 Economica 305 (1966);
Malinvaud, A Planning Approach to the Public Goal Problem, Swed. J. Econ. 96 (1971); and
Baumol supra note 11, at 311.
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N
Z Sk

(2)

or

(chooses X industry)

Zi + Xp= pg (1,NS)

Sr + L
N-I

N
E Sk (3)
kpi

Mr. i will choose that constraint which is least binding. With
everyone free to choose the most profitable industry, the market will
react by changing p and until the RHS of both (2) and (3) are equal.
Before imposition of the effluent tax, free entry, by equalizing the
RHS of (2) and (3), was one of the sufficient conditions which
guaranteed a world of equals. After the tax is imposed, free entry
preserves the world of equals by again equating every person's income
stream. As we move from a world of equals to a (different) world of
equals by imposition of the fee system, we have introduced no
inequites.
Mr. i can also be two firms by putting some labor in X and some in
Z. More generally we can include Lias another variable of maximization and write a single revenue constraint
Zi + pXi = (I-Li)Z

o

N

+ pg(Li, Si) - Sir +

T

+

N-i

Z SK

(2')

k:i

With Li=0, Mr. i chooses the Z industry and constraint (2); with
Mr. i chooses the X industry and constraint (3). Li measures the
fractional part of Mr. i that is in the polluting industry.
However, since both production functions are homogenous, Mr. i is
indifferent to scale and once the RHS of (2) and (3) are equalized, we
can arbitrarily assign a marginal Mr. i to either X or Z. The total
number of effective firms 2; Li in the polluting industry will be
determined by the maximizing conditions, and as long as we keep Z Li
N

Lk people to be
k
in the X industry and the rest in the Z industry. Conceptually, at most
only one person needs to be a partial firm in both industries.
After the market maximizing process is completed, we find anyone
specialized in the X industry is generating smoke at a level in which
at the optimal level, we can reallocate the first N

- XpgS + XT = 0
or pgs

= T.

(first-order Lagrangian condition with
respect to smoke)

October 19731

FAILURE OF BRIBES AND STANDARDS

The effluent tax leads Mr. i to the necessary condition (1) for a
Pareto optimum. To prove the optimality of the fee system, we
normally would have to look at many more than one Pareto condition.
However, our model is a replica of the usual competitive general
equilibrium model save in one respect. Each firm uses factors L and S
and sells products X or Z competitively. The only difference between
the usual competitive model and the fee system is that smoke has the
unusual "supply curve" 1

(see Fig. A-i). There is nothing

unusual about the derived demand for smoke (pgs), which is just
the marginal revenue product for smoke. While unusual, the supply
curve has the necessary property of measuring the social cost of the
last unit of smoke demanded, as we have just checked. Thus we know
that, as well as preserving the equitable world of equals, the fee
system is Pareto-optimal.
Given the optimal T has the virtuous property of making a pollution
model behave like a competitive one with only private goods, how is
7 to be chosen? While it is most difficult "free rider" problem in
general, setting r is considerably more tractable in the confines of this
simple model. First, the model does not aspire to the principle of
marginal benefit taxation. Instead of paying out the revenue from Ton
a marginal damage basis, it is paid out proportionally to all. Thus the
benefit from exaggerating one's own damage is diluted by a factor of
N. Second, the benefit which might otherwise accrue to an individual
polluter from exaggerating the harmlessness of his effluent will be
immediately lost due to free industry entry.
One other conditon, equal utility functions, would make the
situation completely symmetric. Suppose for a minute that we have
all the conditions of symmetry-equal resource ownership, proportional distribution of the effluent tax revenue, free mobility, and equal
utility functions-and we start from an equilibrium defined by the
optimal r. Would any individual have an incentive to lie about his
marginal damage from smoke? As the "benefits" of lying would spread
to everyone, the world of equals would be preserved, but the value of
the economic pie would be somewhat less, due to price distortions
from an incorrect 7. Everyone, including the liar, would be a little
worse off. Under these strict assumptions, the free rider problem
evaporates.
Next let us allow different utility functions but keep the other
symmetry conditions. We can imagine a frequency distribution of the
true marginal rates of substitution of the true marginal rates of
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substitution of smoke for dollars compensation (at given levels of X, Z,
S). From this distribution we can further imagine the distribution of r
desired by individuals. For the sake of definiteness let us suppose that
each person defines his desired r by multiplying his own marginal rate
of substitution by N, on the myopic grounds that everyone else should
have the same evaluation of smoke damage as he does, whether or not
he perceives differences in fact. (A Sierra Club member wishes
everyone had the same high evaluation.)
Frequency
B

C

A

Median) \Mean

Desired

T

Figure A-2
Next, suppose r is chosen on the basis of majority voting. A
candidate r is sent to the voters, who are asked if the social choice or
T should be higher, lower or the same. If a majority prefer a higher -r,
a higher candidate is sent to the voters until
higher + same 2 lower
lower + same > higher.

It seems clear that, if the average of the true marginal damages
equals the median of the desired r distribution and if people estimate
honestly, the voting definition of r will coincide with the economic
definition of optimal T. Supposing this conjecture to be true, will
there be an incentive to lie? Individual A to the right of the median
would like to see a higher r, but exaggerating his estimate of the
marginal damage will have no effect. He could affect the outcome by
claiming a low aggregate social marginal damage, but it would not be
in his interest to do so. Correspondingly, the only way B could affect
the outcome would be to exaggerate his claim of damage to be greater
than the median, but it would be aginst his interest to do so. Finally,
there is C who sits on the median. Exaggeration in either direction
will affect the outcome, but C has no incentive to do so. In his view, 'r
is just right, the way it already is.
Of course, the main practical problems to a voting approach are a
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lack of information and barriers to mobility and hence industry efforts
to lower r. It might be interesting to ask when an individual's
estimates of the aggregate marginal damage as N times his own would
be good enough for voting to prove a Pareto-optimal T. In the
frequency distribution, there might be a long tail to the right, in
which case majority voting would be biased toward too small a T.
Also, this type of model suggests that if firms are allowed to use
business income for lobbying for lower r, the voting choice will be too
low compared with the economic definition of r.
D. Markets with Bribes
Under the bribe system each person makes the same maximization
as before, except with somewhat different revenue constraints.
Here we appreciate the dilemma inherent in the bribe system. To
know which revenue constraints obtain, we must know who get lump
sum bribes. If everyone gets a lump sum bribe, the system becomes
indistinguishible from the fee system. If the lump sum bribe goes to
only those who happened to be polluters at the time of imposition of
the bribe system, inequities are introduced, since the model is no
longer a world of equals. And finally, if the lump sum bribe is
conditioned on membership to the polluting industry at the present
time, the bribe system become inefficient. We explore in detail this
third possibility.
Our arbitrary individual Mr. i will
N
max

Ui (ZiX

i,

Z Sk)

subject to either

kpi

{Xi, Z1,SiI
(chooses Z industry)
+ pX

i

o

= Z

N-I-

N
Z
k]:i

(LkS°

Sk)

(4)

or (chooses X industry)
Zi + pXi = pg(1,S i) + (S - Si) r

__l
The term N-1

N
k :i

(LkS°

N
-

(LkSo

-

Sk)

(5)

k) is each person's share of the total

tax collection necessary to finance bribes for every polluter.
Corresponding to the previous case, we are assuming that everyone
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but Mr. i carries the same share of the tax burden to finance Mr. i's
bribe, and likewise for the other polluters.
The appearance of Lk into the last term of RHS (4) and (5) is due to
an asymmetrical feature of the bribe system. If a firm in the X
industry generates no smoke, society must raise SOr revenue to give
him the full lump sum bribe. On the other hand, a firm in the Z
industry will generate no smoke and society will not raise any money
(Z) to bribe him. For the fee system there was no need to distinguish
between which industry a firm belonged to. The fine was simply
levied per unit smoke. But for the bribe system it is necessary to
identify which industry each firm belongs to, since we are conditioning a firm's lump sum bribe on his membership to the polluting
industry. A person belonging half to industry X and producing no
smoke gets half the bribe he would get if he belonged completely to X
and produced no smoke. Thus the role of Li is to count the effective
membership in the X industry in order to compute society's total
lump sum bribe payment.
As before, the market will adjust p and the government r until the
RHS of (4) and (5) are equal. And everyone in the X industry will be
generating smoke a a level in which
-XPgS + XT = 0
or
=
Pgs

T.

Just as with the fee system, the bribe system leads Mr. i to the
necessary condition (1) for a Pareto optimum. Each polluter under the
bribe system will have the same level of smoke generation (a new S*)
as each other polluter. And each firm in the X industry will generate
the socially efficient ratio of L to S. In this sense the bribe system and
fee system are indeed symmetrical.
However, the problem of the bribe system is not in allocation of
resources for a firm already in the X industry. The problem is with the
too great incentive for firms to enter the polluting industry. Suppose
we have the bribe system at its equilibrium point. If we can show that
a switch of a firm from X to Z creates benefits greater than the costs,
we know the bribe system is not Pareto-optimal. In a switch from X to
Z the benefits are Zoand the reduction of S* and the cost is the loss of
g(1,S*) units X.
In terms of Z, the value of S* units of abatement is S*'r and the
value of the loss of X is pg(1,S*). From the equality of the RHS of (4)
and (5) we know
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Z° = pg(I,S*) + r(S ° - S*)

so

Z° + rS* > pg(1,S*),

which proves that the presently defined bribe system is non-optimal.
The problem of course is with the "lump sum transfer" Sr.
To remove the inefficiency of the "lump sum bribe" as a price
signal to enter the polluting industry, the bribe could be offered to
any firm which would enter the polluting industry in order to obtain
the bribe and to any firm in the polluting industry that wants to exit
but stays in the polluting industry to retain the bribe. In the above
model, these offers to extend the lump sum bribe immediately
guarantee everyone will get the lump sum bribe. And in the model
this extended version of the bribe system is indistinguishable from a
fee system.
It is also clear in the model, before regulation, that change alone
dictates whether or not a firm is a polluter. Thus the snapshot bribe
system creates permanent inequities with no basis.
E. Markets with Standards
The government sets an absolute limit (per unit time) for each
firm's emission at S* where there is an efficient amount of pollution
(judged on the basis of abatement costs and social damage from
pollution). In the post-regulation equilibrium, each firm will be
indifferent between being a polluter with income pg(l,S*) or a
non-polluter with income Z° . So in equilibrium
Z° = pg(1,S*),

if we switch a polluter into the non-polluting industry, we lost g(l,S*)
units of X while we gain abatement of S* and Zounits Z. In terms of Z,
we gain Z° + rS* and lose only pg(1,S*), which proves that the
absolute standard system is non-optimal.
As mentioned previously concentration standards have the same
inframarginal problem.' 8 In addition, concentration standards are
likely to overuse the diluting medium. The worst case arises when
damage is a function of the pollutant's concentration once mixed in
the receiving medium and not at the end of the smokestack or pipe. In
this case it makes no difference whether the concentration at the end
of the pipe is 50 PPM or 500 PPM. The difference in the street-level
density, 1 or 2 PPM, is determined by the number of pounds of
pollutant discharged per unit time.
18. See p.

supra.
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Suppose the concentration standard is M PPM. Then, in equilibrium, a polluting firm will be willing to pay and hence by paying
pgs/1,000,000 per unit diluting medium. By acquiring extra diluting
medium, by building larger intake pipes, etc., the firm can legally
emit more pollution, valued for its marginal revenue product. While
the diluting medium at the end of the pipe is thus indirectly valuable
to the private firm, it is worthless to society. In this worst case, society
would be better off if it permitted the firm to pollute the same
absolute amount with less effort spent on dilution.
Of course the actual case is likely to be mixed, damage being a
function mostly of total load once mixed in the receiving medium but
part also a function of concentration at the end of the pipe. Only in
the unlikely case of damage being a function of just concentration at
the end of the pipe would concentration standards make sense, but
the intramarginal inefficienty would remain.

